power relations in East Asia and their strong sense of nationalism and racial identity.
As the United States became engulfed in the Great War in Europe, President Wilson embraced an idealistic internationalism centered around principles of open diplomacy, freedom, self-determination, and international justice. He was convinced that these were universal principles, and he sought to make them the basis upon which every nation conducted foreign relations. Wilson's universalistic idealism stemmed from his unwavering faith in Christianity and in the superior moral values, political sophistication, cultural traditions, and racial characteristics of Western civilization.2
Wilson's failure to resolve his disagreements with Japan stemmed to no small extent from his firm belief in the universality of his internationalist ideals: Nations that failed to adhere to his ideals he considered morally wrong. He unilaterally applied his ideals to the East Asian situation without a full comprehension of regional realities. His knowledge of East Asia was limited and colored by reports from diplomats and "experts" who shared his zeal for America's mission in East Asia. By treating Japan as a morally inferior state and turning America's rivalry with Japan in East Asia into a crusade against an uncivilized force, Wilson made it impossible to find a workable compromise. Wilson's inflexible unilateralism was one of the limitations of his idealism.
As a late developer by Western standards, Japan strove to attain equality with the West and join the ranks of the great powers. It emulated rivals by adopting their expansionist and imperialist practices. Because of geographical proximity, Japan was eager to benefit from the treaty port system the Western powers had established in China. Japanese leaders quickly learned to use alliances, secret treaties, and, if necessary, mili-tary force to further their national interests. They paid due respect to the existing rules and precedents in the imperialist game established by the Western powers. Japan did not take any drastic actions without reaching prior understandings with other major powers, especially its ally, Great Britain. In these ways, Japanese leaders considered their country to be a fair player in the arena of international competition.
Nevertheless, the view of the world that Japanese leaders embraced at the time of World War I was provincial. It focused narrowly on the protection of Japan's security and the enhancement of national interests and prestige. Having established a foothold on the northeastern edge of the Asian continent through wars with China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904 Russia ( -1905 , Japanese leaders searched for a more self-assertive foreign policy appropriate for an emerging great power in Asia. The outbreak of hostilities in Europe provided the opportunity to launch a vigorous program of continental expansion, and throughout the war Japanese foreign policy was built upon the selfish purpose of national aggrandizement. However, the diplomatic blunder of the Twenty-one Demands on China-the 1915 treaties in which China agreed to abide by Japanese-German agreements over the disposition of German rights, interests, and concessions in Shandong at the close of the war-triggered a serious debate in Tokyo over the rationale and the method of Japanese continental expansion.
In the course of searching for a comprehensive new policy toward the Asian continent, senior leaders in Japan gradually developed a pluralistic and regionalistic approach to justify Japanese hegemony in East Asia. By focusing on both the geopolitical separation of Asia from the West and the differences between the racial and cultural heritage of Asian and Western states, they moved toward a pluralistic stance, arguing that a nation's conduct could be based on different principles from those laid out by the Western great powers.
Similarly, from the outset of the modernization efforts, many political and intellectual leaders in Japan claimed that a "special relationship" existed between Japan and China. They pointed to obvious geopolitical, economic, and strategic commonalities, and, particularly among powerful senior statesmen known as "genro," to the idea of a "common culture and com-mon race" (dobun doshu) that the peoples of the two countries shared. Genro Masayoshi Matsukata argued in favor of a special position for Japan in China by using the idea of Japanese "tutelage" over China. Another genro, Shigenobu Okuma, who served as premier from 1914 to 1916, espoused the idea of the "yellow man's burden."3 During World War I, Aritomo Yamagata, the most influential genro, emerged as the leading advocate of Sino-Japanese cooperation and articulated a series of famous policy slogans, such as Sino-Japanese "accord" (teikei) and "coexistence and coprosperity" (kyoson kyoei). Yamagata believed that the Great War was part of an international trend toward "an increasing intensity in racial rivalry." Pointing to racial discrimination against Asians, such as the anti-Japanese movement in California, he argued that if the colored races of Asia hoped to compete with the culturally advanced white races, "China and Japan, which are culturally and racially alike, must become friendly and promote each other's interests."4 Although he admitted that Japan had specific national interests in Manchuria, he emphasized that Japan must also set its sights on "the self-protection of Asians and for the coexistence and co-prosperity of China and Japan."5 Japan's wartime leaders saw in these arguments the ideological foundation for an Asian Monroe Doctrine, a Japanese version of imperialism that was regionalistic and even antiWestern in motivation.
Yamagata and other Japanese leaders exhibited curiously ambivalent attitudes toward China. On the one hand, they believed that their country's national survival dictated that they secure Japan's "life-line" to the continent by any means possible, including exploitation of their weak neighbor through intimidation and coercion, so far as the great powers would permit. Simultaneously, as the only non-Western imperial power in East Asia, the Japanese also felt justified in claiming a special pater- nalistic position in the region on the grounds of geographical propinquity as well as common racial and cultural background. They naively believed that China would accept Japan's tutelage if it understood Japan's true intentions. For example, when Yamagata proposed a Sino-Japanese entente pledging "union and cooperation," his foremost goal was to encourage China's confidence in Japan through persuasion and guidance. In doing so, he took it for granted that China would follow Japan's leadership and consult with Tokyo in its dealings with other foreign countries.
In In contrast to America's global peace program, Japan was concerned with the issues that affected its interests in East Asia and the Pacific. Japan's objectives at the peace conference concentrated narrowly on three areas: 1) succession to the German rights and concessions in Shandong, 2) acquisition of the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator (the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas), and 3) securing safeguards against racial discrimination in the event that the conference decided to establish the League of Nations.
In September 1918, a few days before his resignation, Premier Masatake Terauchi, protege of Genro Yamagata, had further fortified Japan's claims to the Shandong Railway by concluding three new agreements with the Beijing government under Duan Qirui. Terauchi, who shared his mentor's vision of Sino-Japanese cooperation (teikei) and "the coexistence and co-prosperity of China and Japan," had worked during the war to instill in Chinese leaders a reliance on the Japanese Empire through financial assistance known as the Nishihara Loans. Terauchi had used part of these loans to strike a deal with the Duan government on the Shandong Railway. In the Sino-Japanese agreement signed on September 24, 1918, the two countries agreed to place the Shandong Railway (between Jiaozhou and Jinan) under their joint management and to share police duty along the railway. One of the provisions, which later became controversial at the peace conference, stipulated that the "Japanese are to be employed at the headquarters of this police force, at the main stations, and at the police training school." In two other agreements (signed on September 28), the Duan government accepted a loan of 40 million cabinet formally decided that the Japanese government would return the territorial rights of Jiaozhou Bay to China only after Germany ceded the leased territory to Japan unconditionally. This would avoid the possibility of a direct restitution of the territory from Germany to China. The council and Hara also decided to insist on Japan's authority to settle the issue of retrocession directly with China without outside interference.18 What the Japanese really wanted to acquire, through the two-step procedure described above, were the railway and the coal mines in Shandong Province. War Minister Giichi Tanaka bluntly reminded Advisory Council members that, should Japan fail to obtain the Shandong Railway, it would lose control of Shandong Province as a whole, thereby losing "the artery that extends the power" of the Japanese Empire to the Asian continent. The council overwhelmingly supported specific instructions to Japanese delegates at Paris, directing them to do their "very best" to secure the railway and the mines. In demanding the cession of these economic interests from Germany, the Japanese delegates were to set forth "a plain and straightforward political argument based on the rights of a victor."19 Senior Japanese statesmen shared a self-indulgent belief that China would accept Japan's tutelage if they could make China understand Japan's true intentions. When the Japanese foreign minister learned from Beijing that Chinese Foreign Minister Lu Zhengxiang intended to visit Tokyo on the way to Paris and make careful "preliminary arrangements" on the matter of Chinese peace terms with the Japanese authorities, he interpreted the report as the Chinese foreign minister's willingness to reach an understanding with Tokyo on the Shandong issue. Accordingly, the Advisory Council on Foreign Relations adopted a resolution to the effect that, upon the Chinese foreign minister's arrival in Tokyo, "we will explain our decision [on the retrocession of Jiaozhou] and make him understand our just attitude and clear away misunderstandings; hold in check the development of second-rate and lowerranked nations." Accordingly, the council unanimously supported a resolution that at the peace conference 1) Japan would try to postpone the creation of the League of Nations; and 2) in case the peace conference decided to organize the League, the Japanese delegation must seek a safeguard against racial discrimination.23
In this way, Japanese objectives at the Paris Peace Conference challenged Wilsonian principles at two levels. Japan's territorial claims tested the Wilsonian ideal of self-determination and its unilateral application to German concessions and colonies. Japan's efforts to secure safeguards against racial discrimination in the League of Nations questioned the effectiveness and fairness of the principle of international federalism embodied in the League of Nations. Japanese regional and racial identities questioned the universality of the Westernoriented solution to international conflicts.
Once the peace conference began, the Japanese delegation discovered that the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific was the least divisive issue separating them from President Wilson. After Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa demanded annexation of the German colonies under their occupation, the Japanese simply asked for equal treatment in the Pacific north of the equator. While British and American negotiators tried to work out a compromise, Japan's delegates remained silent. President Wilson, who was determined to approve nothing less than a system of mandates under the supervision of the League of Nations, clashed with Prime Minister William Hughes of Australia. Eventually Wilson prevailed, and Hughes agreed to accept the provisions of the "C-Mandate," which stipulated that the German islands were to be "administered under the laws of the mandatory states as in- islands. Indeed, Nobuaki Makino, the leading member of the Japanese delegation at Paris, strongly urged his government to approve the mandatory proposal. After learning from Lloyd George that Australia and New Zealand were expected to accept the mandatory principle, Makino advised Tokyo that it would be unwise for Japan alone to oppose. He explained that the mandatory idea appeared to be intended as a face-saving gesture to Wilson by upholding the mandatory principle and at the same time guaranteeing the virtual annexation of the German islands by the British Dominions.25 To Makino, the deal was a realistic compromise.
Wilson expressed some uneasiness about granting the northern islands to Japan. On January 30, 1919, the day the decision was reached on the mandate system, he told David H. Miller that "these islands lie athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines and... they could be fortified and made naval bases by Japan." Referring to the Japanese government's breach of faith with regard to the Siberian intervention, the President confided that he would not trust the Japanese again. He had also written to Colonel House earlier that "a line of islands in her Japan's] possession would be very dangerous to the U.S." However, his concern was mitigated later when Tokyo accepted the provisions for a "CMandate," which prohibited the construction of naval bases or fortifications on these islands.26
More problematic for Japan was the issue of race and the League of Nations, for Japan's attempt to include a racial equality clause in the League of Nations covenant was thwarted by unforeseen circumstances. Some contemporaries (and some later historians) have held that Japan used the racial equality proposal as a bargaining chip to obtain the German concessions in Shandong.27 The Japanese concern about racial discrimination, however, was genuine; Tokyo's instructions on this issue were explicit from the very beginning. Shandong when both claims met with strong opposition at Paris. But Japan's decision to withdraw the proposal for racial equality was a result, primarily, of adamant objection from the British Dominions.
At the outset of the conference, the Japanese delegation worried that the United States might be the major obstacle to Japan's racial equality proposal. Makino knew how politically troublesome the racial issues could be for terfering in America's domestic affairs.32 The truth is that the American commissioners were reluctant to accept even the modified Japanese proposal for racial equality. As Dr. Cary T. Grayson put it, "it was not necessary for the United States openly to oppose the suggested amendment because Australia and New Zealand through the British representatives had taken the position of positive opposition." Because of the outright objection of the British Dominions, the Japanese even felt grateful to Colonel House, on whom they called almost every day to work out a compromise. House wrote in his diary: "It has taken considerable finesse to lift the load from our shoulders and place it upon the British, but happily, it has been done."33 Second, caught in the crossfire between Japan's proposal and the opposition of the British Dominions, Wilson did not want a heated debate or publicity on this sensitive issue outside the conference room. He was so preoccupied with the establishment of the League of Nations that he did not want the question of race to become a divisive issue. "My own interest," Wilson said to the commission, "is to quiet discussion that raises national differences and racial prejudices. I would wish them, particularly at this juncture in the history of the relations with one another, to be forced as much as possible into the background." One of the limitations of Wilson's idealist approach to the League of Nations seems to have been his decision to let racial prejudices "play no part in the discussions connected with the establishment of this League."34 To achieve his noble goal, he chose to close his eyes to one of the most serious factors contributing to political fragmentation in the world.
The settlement of the German rights and concessions in Shandong, Japan's primary objective at Paris, turned out to be one of the most controversial issues at the peace conference. It surprised and frustrated all the parties involved, especially the Japanese and Americans. As the conference unfolded, Japanese delegates who had not anticipated much difficulty in securing their claims to Shandong met with formidable oppo- Premier Hara, who stated that his government could put up with neither direct restitution to China nor trusteeship by the League of Nations.42 That same day, Foreign Minister Kosai Uchida cabled to the Japanese delegation at Paris not to sign the Covenant of the League of Nations should Japan's Shandong claims be repudiated. He added: "in order to maintain our government's dignity there shall be no room for conciliatory adjustment."43 Tokyo's firm instruction gave the Japanese delegates no way out.
The following day, April 22, after having heard the Japanese and Chinese cases separately, the Council of Four was leaning toward a decision in favor of Japan. First, both Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau made it clear that they had definite wartime agreements with Japan. Second, Japanese delegates declared that they were under an explicit order from their government not to sign the treaty "unless they were placed in a position to carry out Japan's obligation to China." Although the Chinese delegation urged the council to undo the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915 and the agreements signed in 1918, not only the British and French prime ministers but also President Wilson defended the "sacredness of treaties." Wilson had serious reservations about the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1915, but he could not question the validity of the British and French commitment to Japan's claim. Lloyd George stated that his country's engagement with Japan was "a solemn treaty" and that "Great Britain could not turn round to Japan now and say 'All right, thank you very much. We wanted your help, you gave it, but now we think that the treaty was a bad one and should not be carried out."' Ironically, Wilson had to tell the Chinese delegation that "sacredness of treaties had been one of the motives of the war" and that "it had been necessary to show that treaties were not mere scraps of paper."44
Convinced that Japan's threat to withdraw from the peace conference was not a bluff, Wilson chose to compromise. This, he hoped, would provide an "outlet to permit the Japanese to save their face and let the League of Nations decide the matter later." As he put it to Lloyd George and Clemenceau, he believed "it is necessary to do everything to assure that she Japan] joins the League of Nations." He was afraid that "if she stands aside, she would do all that she could want to do in the Far East."45 He apparently believed that the League of Nations would police Japan's behavior in East Asia once it became a member, so that Japan would not violate China's territorial integrity and political independence.
The gist of the compromise the Japanese and President Wilson agreed upon was that, after the German rights had been ceded to Japan, it would return the Shandong Peninsula in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement in Qingdao. Being jealous of protecting Japan's power and prestige in East Asia, the Japanese delegation asserted that this declaration must be "a voluntary expression of the Japanese delegates' interpretation" of the restitution of Shandong stipulated by the treaty of 1915 and that no impression should be given that this decision had been forced upon Japan.
The 
